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Conceptual Framework and Plan of the Book
FOR understanding the results of this study and appreciation of the
qualifications attached to the findings, the reader needs at the outset
a brief explanation of the statistical procedures used and of the con-
ceptual framework which underlies the whole report. In this chapter
a brief explanation of methods and concepts is developed to show
how the findings were derived, while the discussion of the findings
in the next two chapters will serve to elaborate the bare structure
and emphasize its limitations. A detailed exposition of the sources
and procedures appears in Appendix B.
INITIAL STATISTICAL PROCEDURES
All the data are from Statistics of Income, the annual Internal Revenue
Service(formerly Bureau of Internal Revenue) tabulations from
federal income tax returns—Part 1 for individuals, Part 2 for corpora-
tions.
The calculations are limited to double-taxed stockholders, i.e., divi-
dend recipients who had some personal income tax liability. They do
not cover, therefore, dividend recipients who were not subject to the
personal income tax because of income below the minimum or specifi-
cally exempt (e.g. non-profit organizations); nor do they include stock.
holders who did not receive dividends in a particular year. Moreover
the investigation is concerned only with individuals, and omits fiduci-
aries (trusts and estates) subject to personal income tax.
The initial objective of the statistical procedures was the develop-
ment of a distribution of stockholders' income, including in income
their full pro rata share of pre-tax corporate earnings.
The starting point was the Statistics of Income tabulation that
cross-classifies dividend recipients by the size of their adjusted gross
income and their dividend receipts.' In this array, for example, appears
'Adjusted gross income is picked off tax returns for tabulation in Statistics of
Income. Bear in mind that throughout the book this term connotes a specific defini.
tion of income. The "gross" in its title is misleading since itis essentially a net
income concept. In general it is defined as the sum of net income from all sources
(including only 50 per cent of long-term capital gains and excluding interest on
state and local securities and certain other types of income) before personal de-
ductions and exemptions. More particularly, itis defined "as gross income minus
allowable trade and business deductions, expenses of travel and lodging in connec-
tion with employment, reimbursed expenses in connection with employment, de.
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one entry for stockholders (dividend recipients) with adjusted gross
income of $4,000 and under $5,000 of which up to $100 is dividends,
another for those in this same income class with dividend receipts of
$100 and under $200, etc. In all, there are 225 such cells. For each
cell the average adjusted gross income was obtained by assuming it to
be the same for dividend recipients as for all taxpayers; dividends per
stockholder were estimated in each cell by using the mid-point as a
first approximation and then adjusting for consistency with the total
reported for each income class in Statistics of Income.2
Next aggregate net earnings and dividends for all corporations were
computed, and the difference between earnings and dividends deter-
The ratio of this difference to total dividends was used as
a "blow-up" factor which, when applied to dividends, provided the
necessary addition to the average adjusted gross income in each stock-
holder cell to arrive at imputed gross income, i.e., stockholders' income
defined to include their full pro rata share of net corporate
Then, -the income data were rearrayed in 15 imputed gross income
classes. For each class the average imputed gross income and the
fraction representing net corporate earnings were computed. From a
plot of these values we read off the proportion represented by net
corporate earnings at selected imputed gross income levels, some 19
in all, ranging from $1,000 to $500,000.
ductions attributable to rents and royalties, deductions for depreciation and deple-
tion allowhble to life tenants or to income beneficiaries of property held in trust,
and allowable losses from sales of property."(Statistics of Income for 1950, Part
I, p. 7.)
2 In this brief description a number of specific features of the method are not
spelled out. For example, the dividend component of income reported by individ-
uals as income from estates and trusts was estimated. Details of the procedure will
be found in Appendix B.
8 Aggregate net earnings (generally called net corporate earnings in this study) is
the algebraic sum of the net income of income corporations and the deficits of loss
corporations. Itis the sum, therefore, of dividends, net retained earnings and
corporate taxes (normal and surtax and excess profits tax where applicable).
4 The excess of net corporate earnings over dividends was used in deriving this
multiplier because dividends are already included in adjusted gross income. Implicit
in the procedure is the assumption that, on average, for stockholders in every one
of our size cells the pay-out ratio(i.e., the ratio of their dividend
receipts to the earnings of the corporations which paid them) was the same. For
an explanation of why this seemingly strong assumption may be reasonably accurate
see W. L. Crum, "The Taxation of Stockholders," Quarterly Journal of Economics,
February 1950, p. 26. As Crum points out, in the lower income-dividend size cells,
the few securities held by each of the large number of dividend recipients would,
for the group as a whole, average out to a "representative" portfolio; despite the
small number of stockholders in the upper income-dividend cells, the same result





aspect of the pro
Differe..












To this is added
an increment to t






tion. Had this su






I have drawn on the





In addition, I have
on an earlier draft ol
8 Goode, 1951, op.th adjusted gross
isdividends,
idend receipts of
h cells. For each
by assuming it to
rs; dividends per
e mid-point as a




nds was used as
ds, provided the





)mpu ted. From a
presented by net
e levels, some 19
and deple-
perty held in trust,
come for 1950,Part
the method are not
reported by individ-
f the procedure will
ings in this study) is
d the deficits of loss
:ained earnings and
e applicable).
sed in deriving this
ross income. Implicit
in every one
tio of their dividend






ells, the same result
'ariety and coverage.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS
These data provided the basic material for investigation of our prob.
1cm—the extent to which stockholders were differentially taxed during
the period under study. Four measures, each focusing on a particular
aspect of the problem, were used.
Differential against Earnings for Distribution
First to be examined is the alleged double taxation of distributed
earnings. In this connection the relevant component of stockholder
income is not dividends which are net of the corporate tax. Rather,
in estimating the reduction in potentially disposable income caused
by this tax, we must work with the pre-tax equivalent of distributed
earnings, to which we give the title of earnings for distribution.
Assuming for simplicity a corporate tax rate of 50 per cent, then for
every dollar of dividends paid out, corporations must earn two dollars.
If a given "average" stockholder, therefore, has $100 of dividends, the
earnings for distribution component of his income will be $200. The
difference between earnings for distribution and dividends measures
the corporate tax on the distributed segment of net corporate earnings.
To this is added the personal income tax on dividends (considered
an increment to the stockholder's taxable income from other sources)
to obtain the total income tax actually levied on earnings for dis-
tribution.
But this does not measure the differential tax load. For, relating
the corporate tax to the income status of the taxpayer means that the
personal income taxpayer is not deprived of an amount of potential
income equal to the corporate tax payment on earnings for distribu-
tion. Had this sum been paid to him instead of to the government,
it would have been taxable as personal income. So itis only the
difference between the corporate tax and the product of the corporate
tax multiplied by the marginal rate of personal income tax that
represents the extra burden on stockholders' earnings for distribution.6
For example, with the corporate rate at 50 per cent, every dollar of
S The main outlines of this conceptual framework are not novel. In setting it up,
I have drawn on the work of previous investigators, in particular Richard B. Goode
and W. Leonard Crum:
Richard B. Goode, The Corporation Income Tax (Wiley, 1951) and The Postwar
Corporation Tax Structure, (Treasury Dept., Division of Tax Research, 1946).
W. L. Crum, Taxation of Stockholders" (Quarterly Journal of Economics,
February 1950).
In addition, I have benefited greatly from the comments of both Goode and Crum
on an earlier draft of this manuscript.
6 Goode, 1951, cit.
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earnings for distribution bears a 50 cent corporate tax, but had
this 50 cents been paid to stockholders it would have represented
something less than a 50 cent addition to their personal income after
tax. If the relevant marginal rate is 20 per cent, the deprivation due
to the corporate tax will be 40 cents; if the potential marginal rate
is 90 per cent, the corporate tax causes a loss of potential disposable
income of only 5 cents. So the potential personal income tax on earn-
ings for distribution is computed and subtracted from the actual
combined corporate-personal income tax on that component of stock-
holder income to find the net extra burden on the distributed portion
of net corporate earnings. For comparison among income levels and
between years, the absolute extra burden was converted to an incre-
mental effective rate by taking it as a percentage of the earnings for
distribution component. We call this measure the differential against
earnings for distribution.
The derivation of the measure may be summarized symbolically as
follows.(For simplicity, all rates and differentials are expressed as
ratios.)
—effectiverate of corporate tax on earnings for distribution
D = dividends received
Eearnings for distribution; E—C0E= D
P = applicable marginal rate of personal income tax
N6 = absolute extra burden on earnings for distribution
N6
= differential against earnings for distribution
Then





Since P rises as stockholder income rises but never reaches 100 per
cent, the differential against earnings for distribution is a declining
function of stockholders' income, but always positive. In relation to
the distributed segment of net corporate earnings, then, the corporate
tax constitutes a burden that is always smaller than its face amount,
a burden that varies inversely with the level of stockholders' income.
But this is only part of the story.
The lower case form of the symbol is used to designate the particular tax rates
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Differential against Earnings for Retention
There still remains for consideration the undistributed segment of
net corporate earnings—earnings for retention, or the remainder of
net corporate earnings after subtraction of earnings for distribution.
Following the logic of the procedure in connection with the dis-
tributed portion, we compute the corporate tax on earnings for reten-
tion and compare it with the hypothetical personal income tax on
that component of corporate earnings. The difference between these
two tax liabilities is the measure of the net extra burden. This extra
burden, taken as a percentage of earnings for retention, is designated
the differential against earnings for retention.
Add to the symbols listed above:
R = earnings for retention
Creffective rate of corporate income tax on earnings for retention
(This is higher than C6 because earnings for retention are net
of deficits reported by loss corporations.)
Nr = absolute extra burden on earnings for retention
Nr
—fl-=differential against earnings for retention





It is apparent that the differential against earnings for retention
can be positive, zero, or negative depending on the relative heights
of Cr and P. With C,. invariant on stockholders' income and P a
rising function thereof, the differential will be a declining function
of stockholders' income, and at some point in the income scale, if
P is high enough, the differential will become negative. (Note that
because the personal income tax rate schedule is progressive, the P
that applies here is higher than the one in the differential against
earnings for distribution
Differential against Net Corporate Earnings
The combination of the two measures just discussed provides us with
the composite or net result—the differential against net corporate
earnings which, with corporate earnings equal to the sum of earnings
for distribution and earnings for retention, is a weighted average of
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Add to the symbols listed above:
T = net corporate earnings = E +R
= the absolute extra burden on net corporate earnings









The differential against net corporate earnings will, of course, have
the same characteristics as its components. The higher the proportion
of earnings for retention to total corporate earnings, the closerT
lies to Nr/R. Further since both its components behave in the same
way on this score, it will be a declining function of stockholders in-
come. Also, after a point can (and in most years of this study
did) weigh so heavily thatwill turn negative—i.e., an income tax
differential in favor of net corporate earnings will exist at the higher
income levels.
With this differential we can answer the question: how much more
(or less) heavily were corporate earnings actually taxed than they
would have been if subject in full to the personal income tax alone?
Differential against Stockholders' Income
One more measure has been used in our analysis. By relating the extra
burden to the total income of stockholders, we obtain the differential
against (or in favor of) stockholders. It enables us to answer the ques-
tion: how much more heavily, measured in terms of effective rates, were
stockholders actually taxed on the whole of their income from all
sources by the combined corporate-personal income tax system than
they would have been with the corporate tax abolished and their
pro rata share of net corporate earnings subject fully and promptly
to the personal income tax?
24
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Add to the symbols listed above:
Simputed gross income of stockholders
0 = stockholders' income from sources other than net corporate
earnings S —T
= differential against stockholders
S =T-j-0
—theextra burden on net corporate earnings—is also the extra
burden on stockholders, since it is only on the corporate earn-
ings component of their income that stockholders are differen-
tially taxed. Therefore:
S
With 0 positive, the differential against stockholders lies below
that against net corporate earnings.8 But, since the only difference is
in the denominator, the smaller the value for 0, i.e., the larger the
proportion of T in S. the closer Nt/S to Thus, as we shall see,
at the lower stockholder income levels, the two measures diverge
considerably; near the top of the income scale, however, they lie very
close together. This is a reflection of the fact that, except for the
lower portion of the income range, the proportion of T to S is a
rising fraction reading up the array of stockholder incomes.
Three Variants
One problem in our conceptual framework still remains for considera-
tion. As described, the actual tax load on earnings for retention con-
sists simply of the corporation income tax, and the extra burden on
this segment of corporate earningsis measured as the difference
between the corporate tax and the hypothetical personal tax. This
measure is designed variant 1 of our standard method. Values of the
differentials against earnings for retention (and of the differentials
against net corporate earnings and stockholders, in whose derivation
this measure of the extra tax burden on earnings for retentionis
employed) we call variant I values. Variant 1is a clear-cut measure
that tells us for a given year how much more (or less) income tax
stockholders paid on their pro rata share of earnings for retention
than would have been due if this income share .had been subject
promptly and in full to the personal income tax alone. But it leaves
out something.
8 Of course, when the differentials have negative values this means that the
absolute value of the former is the lower, i.e., the differential against stockholders is
less negative.





















For it can be argued that some portion, at least, of retained earnings
would show up as capital gains, and that some of these capital gains
would be realized by stockholders in taxable form. Thus, because of
current retentions, sometime in the future an additional tax liability
would be incurred. Therefore variant 2 was developed. Under variant
2, in measuring the tax load on earnings for retention a term, ex-
plained below, was added to represent the present value of the future
capital gains tax on the undistributed earnings of a given year. Unless
otherwise specified it is the variant 2 values that are used throughout
this study.
To make such an adjustment with precision is impossible, how-
ever. Too many factors about which littleis known are involved.
To what extent do retained earnings show up in share prices? What
proportion of resulting capital gains is realized, and of this what
fraction shows up in taxable form? Our adjustment, therefore, is arbi-
trary but reasonable in the sense that it is in the right direction, and
that substantial changes in the assumptions used in its derivation
would lead to only slight changes in the size of the estimated addi-
tional tax liability on earnings for retention.
Briefly, variant 2 incorporates an additional tax liability on stock-
holders—a capital gains tax—determined on the assumptions that for
each dollar of retained earnings share prices rose by 72 cents, and
that two-thirds of these increments in the value of stock were realized
in taxable form at an even rate over a five year period. The adjust-
ment for the future capital gains tax liability enters as an additive
term in NrIR, and Ne/S.
But it might be argued that this adjustment does not go far enough.
For one assumption used in the variant 2 estimate is that stock prices
rose by only 72 per cent of reinvested earnings, or that 28 cents of
every dollar of retained earnings failed to show up in enhanced stock
values. Apparently, then, when earnings are reinvested rather than
paid out, stockholders lose 28 cents per dollar of such earnings.
Should not this be considered a deprivation and, while not a formal
tax, should it not be taken into account in estimating the extra tax
load on earnings for retention? Despite good grounds for answering
this question in the negative, and because the matter is debatable,
variant 3 was developed. Very simply, in addition to the corporate tax
and the present value of the future capital gains tax due to reinvested
earnings, variant 3 includes the present value of this 28 cent loss as
part of the tax on earnings for retention. This adjustment affects
NrIR, and Ne/S, making them higher than the variant 2
values which, in turn, of course, exceed the variant 1 values of the
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differentials. (An amplified description of the procedures used under
each of the variants and an indication of how much the values differ
will be found in Chapter 2.)
But variant 3 seems to cover too much. For there is a difference
between a tax and the reduction in potentially disposable income
caused by the failure of corporations to distribute fully. The latter
lacks the strong element of compulsion that characterizes a federal
tax levy. Stockholders are not forced to acquiesce in corporate dis-
tribution policies. They can press for fuller distribution by the com-
panies whose shares they hold; or acquire shares in corporations whose
policy it is to distribute most of their earnings; or make other kinds
of investments. On this reasoning variant 2 was selected as superior.
Variant 3 goes too far; variant 1 not far enough.
There are additional grounds for doubting the relevance for our
study of the adjustment that distinguishes variant 3. While an attempt
to explain the failure of reinvested earnings to be reflected fully in
share prices lies beyond the scope of this study, grounds for consider-
ing the variant 3 adjustment unwarranted are suggested by several
plausible explanations. To William Vickrey the failure "argues either
that the directors of the corporation have disposed of the undistributed
earnings adversely to the interests of the stockholders or that the
reinvestment has been made on the basis of information not shared
by investors in general."° In either event, it appears that the loss may
not be properly considered as an additional levy on stockholders. It
seems more appropriate to attribute the loss to errors in judgment
on the part of management. Such errors affect the income of share-
holders in corporations that distribute earnings in full and also of
those who, as owners of noncorporate business enterprises, are subject
to the personal income tax. These taxpayers do not profit from any
special tax law solicitude, except that because of their losses the
capital gains they report may be smaller or the capital losses they
deduct may be larger. An estimated overall loss on this account is
taken into account by the variant 2 adjustment which reckons the
future capital gains as 28 per cent less than they might have been.
Another possible explanation of the 28 cent attrition in capital
value for every dollar of reinvestment may be the fact that standard
accounting or tax law determinations of net income regularly result
in overstatement. These determinations may fail to allow for com-
petitive obsolescence, i.e. the degree of capital destruction caused by
shifts in demand and changes in techniques of production, and do
not, as a rule, take account of the higher cost of maintaining inven-
9WilliamVickrey, Agenda for Progressive Taxation, Ronald, 1947. p. 150.
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tories and replacing depreciable assets when price levels rise (except
in the caseinventories for those corporations that use Lifo). Con-
siderations of this sort, however, do not validate the variant S adjust-
ment for our purposes, for the definition of income in our bench-
mark, the personal income tax system,is similarly "shortsighted,"
also failing to take account of these factors. So it may be concluded
that on this score no special adjustment is required in the method.
While, for the reasons cited, variant 2 is preferable and is generally
used in the text discussion, in recognition that, to some extent at
least, the matters at issue are fuzzy enough to give rise to questions
of taste as well as of logic, the differentials based on all three variant
measures of the extra burden on earnings for retention have been
computed for every year of the study and are tabulated in Appendix
A. It will be noted, however, from an examination of these data that
our argument remains basically the same no matter which variant
is judged to be most appropriate; the pattern of the differentials is
the same for all three variants.
ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK
It is hoped that the description of the and concepts which
underlie the whole study will serve for quick reference as the reader
follows the detailed findings presented and discussed in the chapters
that follow. In each, the limitations of the available data and the
shortcomings of the findings are made explicit.
Chapters 2 and S approach the problem by discussing detailed
quantitative findings. Chapter 4 examines the effects on the findings
of some assumptions and procedures alternative to those used in our
standard method.
The scene shifts in Chapter 5 to a consideration of the question of
the progressivity effect of the corporation income tax. Chapter 6 is
concerned with the effects on federal tax revenue and on distribution
of stockholder income of the two types of tax structure which have
been compared at other points in the study. Aggregate rather than
average differential taxation of stockholders is computed by the exist-
ing system of corporate taxation and by a system which would extend
to stockholders the tax treatment now applied to members of a partner-
ship.
Chapter 7, on the basis of our findings, analyzes the provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 designed for relief of stockholders
from double taxation. A brief summary of the findings is given in
Chapter 8. Appendix A contains tabular summaries of the differen-
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